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Abstract
Akamatsu, Sato, and Nguyen (2006) and Akamatsu (2007a,b) proposed a new dynamic trafﬁc congestion control
scheme—the tradable network permit—and proved its efﬁciency properties for general road networks. To implement
tradable permit markets successfully, this paper proposes a novel auction mechanism with capacity control. Assuming
that each user makes a trip from an origin to a destination along a path in a speciﬁc time period, we design an auction
mechanism that enables each user to purchase a bundle of network permits corresponding to a set of links in the user’s
preferred path. The proposed mechanism employs an evolutionary approach to achieve a dynamic system optimal allo-
cation of network permits in a computationally efﬁcient manner. Speciﬁcally, it is a hybrid mechanism that consistently
combines an auction mechanism with a path capacity control, which are repeated on a day-to-day basis. The former
phase involves selling bundles of permits, and the latter phase involves adjusting of the number of the bundles, which
corresponds to the path capacities. We prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (i)
truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each user on each day; and (ii) the permit allocation pattern under the
mechanism converges to an approximate dynamic system optimal allocation pattern in the sense that the achieved so-
cial surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large. Furthermore, we show that the proposed
mechanism can be extended to obviate path enumeration by introducing a column generation procedure.
c© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer review under responsibility of Delft University of
Technology.
Keywords: Dynamic trafﬁc assignment, Transportation demand management, Tradable permits, Auction mechanism,
Capacity control, Benders decomposition, Column generation
1. Introduction
Congestion pricing is considered an effective economic instrument for managing trafﬁc congestion, and
various types of pricing schemes have been proposed since the pioneering work of Pigou (1920) (see Yang
and Huang, 2005; Tsekeris and Voß, 2009; de Palma and Lindsey, 2011, for comprehensive reviews and
other references). Although these schemes work effectively in ideal situations, almost all of them fail to
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take into consideration the important fact that an asymmetric information exists between road managers and
road users. For instance, in the standard congestion pricing, the road manager requires accurate and detailed
demand information (e.g., the desired arrival time and value of time) to calculate optimal toll levels, but it is
almost impossible for the manager to obtain such private information. This lack of information may distort
toll levels and inevitably result in economic losses.
As an alternative to price-based regulation such as congestion pricing, there is another economic instru-
ment called a tradable permits scheme, which is a generalization of quantity-based regulation1. This scheme
directly regulates trafﬁc ﬂows by assigning priority-service permits to road users, which has a great poten-
tial for not only reducing trafﬁc congestion but also resolving the asymmetric information problem. As an
example of such a scheme, Akamatsu et al. (2006) and Akamatsu (2007a,b) proposed a new dynamic trafﬁc
congestion control scheme called tradable network permits, which does not require detailed user informa-
tion. This scheme consists of two parts: (a) the road manager issues a right (network permit) that allows the
permit holder to pass through a bottleneck during a prespeciﬁed time period; and (b) a trading market is es-
tablished for network permits differentiated by a prespeciﬁed time. Under this scheme, queuing congestion
can be completely eliminated for each bottleneck by issuing a number of network permits that is less than
its capacity. For allocating the permits to users, there are two representative schemes: the market selling
scheme and the free distribution scheme. In the market selling scheme, the road manager sells all the permits
to users through the trading markets. In the free distribution scheme, the road manager initially distributes
all the permits to users for free according to methods that consider the equity among users. In this scheme,
the permits allocated for each user does not necessarily match one’s own desired permit. For that case,
users can mutually trade permits in the trading markets. In either case, the asymmetric information prob-
lem is resolved through the trading markets. Furthermore, Akamatsu et al. (2006) demonstrated that under
either permit-allocating scheme the equilibrium achieves the most efﬁcient (i.e., Pareto optimal) resource
allocation for a single bottleneck, and Akamatsu (2007a,b) extended this property to general networks2.
Although the efﬁciency property of the tradable network permits was proved by assuming that a com-
petitive equilibrium can be achieved in the trading markets, no concrete trading mechanism that attains the
equilibrium was shown in those studies. In other words, trading processes were treated as a black-box. Thus,
in order to implement tradable network permits, we need to establish a micro mechanism for the trading mar-
kets. Note that, in terms of the efﬁciency of resource allocation, the abovementioned two permit-allocating
schemes are essentially identical. Therefore, as the ﬁrst step in trading markets design, this paper focuses
on market selling scheme to achieve an efﬁcient allocation as simply as possible3. In this regard, Wada and
Akamatsu (2010) and Wada et al. (2010) designed an auction mechanism for a trading market for a single
bottleneck and showed the following: (i) the network permit allocation pattern achieved under the mecha-
nism is efﬁcient; and (ii) the mechanism is strategy-proof, which means that a dominant strategy employed
by each user truthfully reveals the value of permits. However, extending the auction mechanism to general
networks is not a trivial problem because a naive formulation of the problem leads to NP-hardness owing to
the complex relationship between link and path.
This paper proposes a novel auction mechanism to implement trading markets on general networks with
multiple origin-destination (OD) pairs. Assuming that each user makes a trip from an origin to a destination
via a certain path and within a speciﬁc time period, we design an auction mechanism that enables each user
to purchase a bundle of network permits corresponding to a set of links on the user’s preferred path. We
ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss how the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is a benchmark mechanism
in auction theory (e.g., Milgrom, 2004), cannot possibly be applied to the trading markets because the
combinatorial optimization problem of ﬁnding a network permits allocation pattern is NP-hard. To avoid
such computational infeasibility, we propose an auction mechanism that is readily implementable. This
1For general discussions on the comparison between price-based regulation and quantity-based regulation in the ﬁeld of economics
see, for example, Weitzman (1974) and Laffont (1977).
2We can also generalize the theory to include supply side conditions. Speciﬁcally, Wada and Akamatsu (2012) proposed a dis-
tributed signal control policy based on the tradable network permits, which adjusts a green time proportion by exploiting permit prices.
3To implement the free distribution scheme, we need to design a micro mechanism for a double auction market in which trading
strategies of users are more complicated than those of one-side auction.
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mechanism employs an evolutionary approach that decomposes the combinatorial optimization problem
into two phases, an auction phase and a path capacity adjustment phase, which are repeated on a day-to-day
basis. The path capacity is deﬁned as the number of bundles of permits for the path. In the former phase,
the manager ﬁxes each path capacity and sells the bundles to users through an ascending auction. In the
latter phase, the road manager adjusts each path capacity to an appropriate level by exploiting bundle prices
determined in the auction phase. We then prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable
properties: (i) truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each user on each day; and (ii) the permit
allocation pattern under the mechanism converges to an approximate dynamic system optimal allocation
pattern in the sense that the achieved social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users
is large. Finally, we show that the proposed mechanism can be extended to obviate path enumeration by
introducing a column generation procedure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related works. Section 3 outlines the
framework of the tradable network permits and describes assumptions used throughout the paper. Section 4
deﬁnes a dynamic system optimal allocation of network permits and discusses the impossibility of applying
the VCG mechanism to the trading markets due to NP-hardness. Section 5 presents ideas for a novel auction
mechanism that is readily implementable. Section 6 gives details of the proposed mechanism and clariﬁes
its properties. Section 7 constructs an extended mechanism which obviates path enumeration by exploit-
ing a column generation procedure. Section 8 demonstrates the convergence properties of the proposed
mechanism through a numerical example. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2. Related works
Our study is mainly concerned with dynamic trafﬁc assignments (DTA), some types of transporta-
tion demand management (TDM) schemes (i.e., dynamic congestion pricing schemes and tradable permits
schemes) and combinatorial auctions. The ﬁrst two areas provide an analytical framework for modeling
and managing trafﬁc congestion in transportation networks, whereas the third area provides a foundation for
constructing an auction mechanism to implement trading markets. In particular, auctions for bundled items
with network structure are relevant to our study.
2.1. Dynamic trafﬁc assignment models
Due to the successful incorporation of queuing phenomena into transportation network analysis, there
has been much research into DTA models (e.g., Vickrey, 1969; Kuwahara and Akamatsu, 1993; Cascetta,
2001). For instance, departure time choice models have been developed by Smith (1984b), Daganzo (1985),
Newell (1987), and Iryo and Yoshii (2007), while dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) models have been devel-
oped by Kuwahara and Akamatsu (1993), Smith (1993), Heydecker and Addison (1996), Akamatsu (2001),
and Iryo (2011) and many others (see Peeta and Ziliaskopoulos, 2001; Szeto and Wong, 2011, for compre-
hensive reviews). These studies analyzed the properties of user equilibrium and discussed the effectiveness
of dynamic congestion pricing as shown in the next subsection. However, few studies have discussed the
asymmetric information problem and the effectiveness of quantity-based regulation for eliminating queues.
2.2. Dynamic congestion pricing schemes
Dynamic congestion pricing is a natural extension of the static congestion pricing and is a benchmark
TDM scheme to eliminate queuing congestion. Despite its importance, most studies have been limited to
simple networks (e.g., a single bottleneck) because analyzing DTA models for more general networks is
usually intractable (e.g., Arnott et al., 1990, 1993; Kuwahara, 2007; Doan et al., 2011). However, there
have been some attempts to overcome this difﬁculty. For example, Ziliaskopoulos (2000) and Nie (2011)
studied dynamic marginal cost analyses for system optimal DTA problems with many-to-one (or one-two
many) OD pairs; Yang and Meng (1998) derived an optimal toll based on a time-space network for general
networks; Friesz et al. (2007) formulated a dynamic second-best toll pricing problem for general networks
as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints and developed a solution algorithm, but they did not
address theoretical questions (e.g., algorithm convergence). In effect, no study has established a theory of
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dynamic congestion pricing for general networks in which queues arise. Furthermore, implementations of
the abovementioned schemes unsurprisingly face the difﬁculty associated with asymmetric information.
To address the asymmetric information problem, some studies have developed evolutionary (trial-and-
error) implementation methods for congestion pricing in static settings (Sandholm, 2002, 2007; Yang et al.,
2004; Han and Yang, 2009). These methods set toll levels based on realized trafﬁc ﬂow patterns. The studies
then demonstrated that an appropriate adjustment process of route choice (e.g., Smith, 1984a) converges
to an equilibrium that minimizes the total transportation cost in the network4. This result relies on the
fact that there is an equivalent optimization problem (or a Beckmann-type potential function) for a static
user equilibrium. However, the properties of static and dynamic congestion pricing are different since
the mechanisms of ﬂow and queuing congestion are totally different. The DUE model cannot also be
reduced to an optimization problem in general. Thus, it is not easy to generalize the methods to dynamic
settings. Further, the methods need to set a discriminatory toll to achieve an optimal state when users have
heterogeneous costs (e.g., value of time), but information on such heterogeneities cannot be gathered by
these methods, which means that this approach is not a panacea for the problem even in static settings.
2.3. Tradable permits schemes for managing trafﬁc congestion
A tradable permits scheme that combines a quantity-based regulation and a market institution has been
studied for environmental protection (Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 1980). The capabilities and applica-
bility of this scheme have been increasing, because the emergence of the Internet enables a new market to be
established inexpensively. For managing trafﬁc congestion, a few researchers have studied such a scheme
as an alternative to congestion pricing. Verhoef et al. (1997) discussed the possibilities of using tradable
permits in the various types of regulations for road transport externalities; e.g., vehicle ownership permits,
tradable parking permits, and tradable permits in the regulation of road usage. Teodorovic´ et al. (2008)
proposed an auction-based congestion pricing, for which drivers who want to enter a downtown area have to
participate a downtown time slot auction. Although it formulated the allocation problem for the time slots,
their study did not address how to set their prices, which is the core problem of auction mechanisms. More-
over, the existing studies provide some useful insights into tradable permit schemes for managing trafﬁc
congestion, but none describes time-dependent tradable permits for eliminating bottleneck congestion.
In addition, it is worth mentioning the tradable travel credit scheme proposed by Yang and Wang (2011),
which is superﬁcially similar to but fundamentally different from the tradable network permits scheme5.
Basically, under the tradable travel credit scheme, the road manager initially distributes credits to all eligible
travelers and predetermines a link-speciﬁc credit charge. Credits are freely tradable among the credit holders
in a market. Yang and Wang (2011) showed that, if the manager can appropriately set the total number of
credits and the link-speciﬁc credit charges, a desirable trafﬁc ﬂow pattern is achieved. However, it is apparent
that this scheme requires detailed demand information unlike the tradable network permits6. Further, it is
fair to say that this scheme is not be a quantity-based regulation for managing congestion but rather a
redistribution scheme for income. Indeed, the main advantage of this scheme over the standard congestion
pricing is the improvement in equity and social acceptability, not a direct reduction in trafﬁc congestion.
2.4. Auction mechanisms for networked items
Since the pioneering work of Rassenti et al. (1982), who proposed airport time slot auctions, there has
been a considerable amount of work on combinatorial auctions (e.g., de Vries and Vohra, 2003; Cramton
et al., 2006), which allow bids on combinations of items and thus enhance the economic efﬁciency when
4Yang et al. (2004) and Han and Yang (2009) did not explicitly consider an adjustment process unlike Sandholm (2002, 2007).
Instead, they assumed that user equilibrium trafﬁc ﬂow patterns are realized for any given temporal link toll patterns, which may imply
that it takes a time to obtain each equilibrium by the adjustment process.
5Similar schemes of the tradable travel credit were also discussed in Viegas (2001) and Verhoef et al. (1997).
6Nie (2012) pointed out this fact in the context of comparison with tradable permits for emission control: “Sufﬁce it to say here
that the information that the government would need to run a mobility credit market is as much as the information required to operate
a conventional pricing scheme. Therefore, the mobility credit market does not reduce the administrative burden of the government,
unlike in the case of emission control.”
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bidders have preferences for sets of items (e.g., spectrum rights, airport time slots, railroad segments, and
paths in networks). The most celebrated such auction is the VCG mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke,
1971; Groves, 1973). This mechanism is strategy-proof and can achieve allocative efﬁciency. However, to
maintain these properties, it requires the auctioneer to solve complex combinatorial optimization problems to
determine the allocation and prices (Vickrey payments). Therefore, the VCG mechanism is computationally
intractable in many circumstances, including ours (see Section 4).
In this regard, several authors have showed that such a intractability can be avoided under some re-
stricted circumstances in which combinations of items have network structures. Bikhchandani et al. (2002)
demonstrated that the VCG outcome can be computed by solving two linear programs in the case that a
winner determination problem reduces to a spanning tree problem or a shortest path problem7. Nisan and
Ronen (2001) derived the Vickrey payments for a shortest path problem, and Hershberger and Suri (2001)
developed an efﬁcient algorithm to compute those payments. However, the auctions cannot be implemented
for trading markets because these are reverse auctions that cannot handle multiple buyers (i.e., users).
The studies on bandwidth auctions for communication networks are also related to our study in the sense
that they also focus on an allocation problem for a network capacity that is a limited resource (e.g., Kout-
sopoulos and Iosiﬁdis, 2010). The studies consider the case in which each bidder (e.g., provider) purchases a
quantity of bandwidth over a path in a network. Lazar and Semret (1999) proposed the “progressive second
price auction” for allocating a divisible quantity of bandwidth over a certain path. Dramitinos et al. (2007)
proposed a multi-unit Dutch auction, which allocates an indivisible quantity of bandwidth over a certain
path. Both of these auction mechanisms can induce truth-telling. However, in contrast to the mechanism
that is proposed in this paper, neither takes into account the route choice problem of the bidders (i.e., each
bidder is interested in a single ﬁxed path). From the above discussion, we conclude that there is no network
auction mechanism that enables us to assign network capacities (i.e., network permits) to multiple users who
choose a route in a network, and thus, the proposed mechanism is a major contribution of this paper.
3. A system of tradable network permits for transportation networks
3.1. Networks
In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic trafﬁc ﬂows on a general network (i.e., a transportation
network with general topology). The network consists of a set N of nodes and a set A of directed links.
The node set N includes a subset O of origin nodes from which users start their trips, and a subset D of
destination nodes at which users terminate their trips. A set of origin-destination (OD) pairs is denoted by
W. Each element of A (i.e., each link) is identiﬁed by a sequential natural number a.
The time interval [0, I] for which we assign the dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow is ﬁxed. We assume that each
OD pair’s potential travel demand Qod in the time interval [0, I] is a given constant. The time interval
[0, I] is discretized into small intervals of length Δt: each time point is represented by t = mΔt, where
m = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,M. Each time interval [t, t + Δt] is denoted by t ∈ T and we call this interval time period t.
We also assume, without any loss of generality, that each link in a network consists of a free-ﬂow
segment and a single bottleneck segment. The travel time to pass through the free-ﬂow segment of link a is
a constant ta. We then assume that travel time ta is represented by a natural multiplier of Δt (i.e., an integer
na satisﬁes ta = naΔt). The bottleneck of each link is represented by a point queue model with constant
capacity μa = vehicles/time interval Δt.
3.2. Road network manager and users
The model presented in this paper involves two types of agents: a road network manager and road
network users. The road manager aims to restrain trafﬁc congestion in the network and maximize the social
surplus. To achieve this, the manager regulates the trafﬁc ﬂow rates entering each bottleneck in the network
using time-dependent network permits. The precise deﬁnition and setup of the network permit system are
described in Subsection 3.3.
7Bikhchandani et al. (2002) also dealt with more general cases.
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Within the time interval [0, I], each atomic user i ∈ Nod (i.e., |Nod| = Qod) makes at most a single trip in
the network from an origin (e.g., residential zone) to a destination (e.g., the central business district). This
means that all users do not necessarily make trips, which corresponds to the conventional trafﬁc assignments
with elastic demand (see also Subsection 6.1). The user chooses a destination arrival time period and a
path between the origin and destination so as to maximize his or her utility. Under the system of network
permits, each user must purchase a bundle of permits corresponding to a set of links included in the user’s
chosen path. This implies that choosing a destination arrival time period and a path directly corresponds to
purchasing time-dependent network permits in the trading markets.
3.3. Network permits and trading markets
A “time-dependent network permit” is a right that allows the permit holder to pass through a prespeciﬁed
bottleneck at a prespeciﬁed time. In this paper, we assume that the manager can issue time-dependent
network permits for all bottlenecks (i.e., links) in the network. This implies that the trafﬁc ﬂow entering the
link a in time period t consists only of users who have a permit for link a in time period t and a user without
this permit cannot pass through the link in this time period.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the number of permits issued for each link in each time period is
equal to or less than the bottleneck capacity of each link in the network. This means that queuing congestion
never occurs in the network under this permit-issuing scheme. This is clear from an explanation of the
permits: the inﬂow rate of each link is equal to (or less than) the number of permits issued, and so the inﬂow
rate cannot exceed the capacity of the link, which implies that queuing congestion can never occur at a link.
The permits issued for each link (bottleneck) are put on sale by the road manager. Each user who
would like to use a path must purchase a bundle of permits corresponding to a set of links included in the
user’s preferred path. In the trading markets, the prices and the allocation of time-dependent permits are
determined through an auction mechanism. The detailed trading rules are given in Section 6.
It must be admitted that the procedures for trading network permits seem unrealistic at ﬁrst glance,
but implementation of these would become feasible with futuristic vehicles in which an agent software
is installed to manage driving, navigation and safety. From this perspective, the mechanism proposed in
this paper can be viewed as the protocol of a multi-agent system in which the agent software executes the
procedures for trading network permits on behalf of users.
3.4. Dynamic travel costs and user utility in general networks
The transportation cost for a single trip made by a network user consists of “schedule cost” and “travel
cost.” The schedule cost for user i is the cost due to the difference between the user’s desired arrival time
period ti and the actual arrival time period t. The schedule cost is represented by a function si(t, ti) of both
destination arrival time and desired arrival time. The travel cost is the monetary equivalent of the travel time
for a trip from the origin to the destination. The travel times differ among the paths. The travel time of a
path between the OD pair is deﬁned as the sum of travel times of the links included in the path. Note that
the travel time of each link a is a constant ta under the permit system since there is no queuing. Hence, the
travel time Tr for path r ∈ Rod between the OD pair is also constant:
Tr =
∑
a∈A
taδa,r(o,d), (1)
where δa,r(o,d) is a typical element of the path-link incidence matrix for the node pair (o, d); it is 1 if link a is
on path r connecting the OD pair (o, d) and zero otherwise.
We suppose that each user has a private valuation vi,r(t) for each path r and each destination arrival time
period t. This valuation vi,r(t) represents a nonnegative value of trip between OD pair along path r in time
period t. For example, to show a correspondence with conventional trafﬁc assignments, we can specify the
valuation as
vi,r(t) ≡ wi − (si(t, ti) + αiTr) , (2)
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where wi is a parameter, which is interpreted as the trip utility (or willingness-to-pay) between the OD pair,
and αi is a coefﬁcient that converts travel time into a monetary equivalent.
Each user is assumed to have a quasi-linear utility function (we use the term “payoff” interchangeably
with “utility”). Speciﬁcally, each user’s utility ui,r(t) for path r in time period t is represented as the differ-
ence between private valuation and the “permit purchase cost Pr(t)” determined in an auction:
ui,r(t) ≡ vi,r(t) − Pr(t). (3)
The permit purchase cost is the total payment for purchasing the bundle of link permits required for traveling
along a path and arriving at the destination in a certain time period.
4. Dynamic system optimal allocation of network permits
The objective of an auction mechanism, such as that designed in this paper, is to achieve a network
permit allocation pattern that maximizes a social surplus (i.e., dynamic system optimal allocation). The
social surplus is deﬁned as the sum of user’s valuations. This excludes user payments to the road manager
to purchase permits because these payments are simply income transfers between the users and the road
manager. Thus, we formulate an optimization problem [DSO] of providing the dynamic system optimal
allocation of network permits:
max
(f,x)
. SS(f) ≡
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) fi,r(t) (4)
subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
fi,r(t) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W (5)
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
xi,a(t) ≤ μa ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (6)
xi,a(t) =
∑
r∈Rod
fi,r(t + Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod ∀od ∈W (7)
fi,r(t), xi,a(t) ∈ {0, 1} ∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W, (8)
where fi,r(t) denotes the allocation of a bundle of permits to user i and xi,a(t) denotes the allocation of a
network permit to user i. Speciﬁcally, fi,r(t) is 1 if user i is allocated a bundle of permits for a set of links
required to travel along path r and to arrive in time period t and is zero otherwise. Hence, xi,a(t) is 1 if user
i is allocated a network permit for link a in time period t and is zero otherwise.
The combinatorial optimization problem of ﬁnding an efﬁcient network permit allocation pattern (f∗, x∗),
subject to the physical constraints on ﬂows representing the network performance. The ﬁrst constraint (5)
is the condition that each user makes at most one trip in the interval [0, I]. The second constraint (6) is the
capacity constraint on each link. The third constraint (7) expresses the ﬂow conservation between link ﬂows
and path ﬂows for each user; that is, the link ﬂow xi,a(t) entering into link a in time period t is the sum of
the ﬂows on all paths going through that link and arriving at the destination at time t + Ta,r. The travel time
required for arriving at the destination from the upstream node k (of the link a) through path r (containing
link a) is given by:
Ta,r =
∑
a′∈A
ta′δa′,r(k,d), (9)
where δa′,r(k,d) is a typical element of the path-link incidence matrix for node pair (k, d).
Although the road manager seeks to solve the problem [DSO] to achieve the system optimal permit
allocation pattern, solving the problem directly poses two major difﬁculties: (i) the objective function of
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the problem includes users’ private valuations, and (ii) the problem is NP-hard (i.e., no polynomial-time
algorithm exists for it). The ﬁrst difﬁculty comes from the obvious fact that the manager cannot accurately
obtain such private information. The second difﬁculty comes from the fact that the problem [DSO] is an
integer multicommodity ﬂow problem.
One possible way to address these difﬁculties might be to apply conventional combinatorial auctions
to this problem. For example, the VCG mechanism can overcome the ﬁrst difﬁculty, at least in principle,
because it gives users an incentive (Vickrey payment) to report their valuations truthfully (i.e., strategy-
proofness). However, the VCG mechanism cannot overcome the second difﬁculty because the above men-
tioned problem [DSO] must be solved exactly to determine the optimal permit allocation and to compute
the Vickrey payments (i.e., it is computationally infeasible). One natural approach to handling the problem
is to seek a sub-optimal solution instead of the optimal solution. However, the VCG mechanism allowing
nonoptimal allocations is not strategy-proof, as each user has an incentive to bid false valuations to increase
one’s own utility (Nisan and Ronen, 2007). Therefore, it is difﬁcult to apply the VCG mechanism directly
to the trading markets.
5. Day-to-day auction mechanism: an auction mechanism with day-to-day capacity control
In this section, we propose a novel auction mechanism including a day-to-day capacity control, which is
readily implementable for general networks. We call this mechanism the day-to-day auction mechanism. To
avoid computational infeasibility such as that in the case of the VCG mechanism, the proposed mechanism
employs an evolutionary approach. Although the evolutionary approach cannot be employed for the one-
shot auctions that are typically treated in auction theory, it can be utilized for a tradable network permits
scheme in which the auction is opened to morning commuters each day.
Before describing the proposed mechanism, we introduce some modiﬁcations of the model. In the
proposed mechanism, we consider time-dependent permit allocation patterns and their day-to-day dynamics.
We then denote the day by s ∈ S. Suppose that each user behaves myopically and makes one’s own choice
so as to maximize the following utility deﬁned for each day s:
usi,r(t) ≡ vi,r(t) − Psr(t). (10)
This implies that the user considers only his or her allocation of the bundles and payment on each day, so
the user’s true valuations are constant for all days.
5.1. Reformulation of the DSO problem with path capacities and the Benders decomposition principle
The day-to-day auction mechanism is based on the idea of reformulating the problem [DSO] by introduc-
ing non-individual variables and then applying the Benders decomposition principle (e.g., Benders, 1962;
Lasdon, 1970) to obtain two problems, a master problem and a sub-problem. We then solve these problems
on day-to-day basis. Further, in order to obtain an efﬁcient permit allocation with imperfect information
about users, the mechanism also exploits an auction mechanism to solve the sub-problem.
We let Fr(t),Xa(t) ∈ Z+ denote a non-individual path variable and a non-individual link variable, re-
spectively. By using these variables, the problem [DSO] with non-individual variables is formulated as
max
(f,F,X)
. SS(f,F) ≡
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) fi,r(t) (11)
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subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
fi,r(t) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W (12)
∑
i∈Nod
fi,r(t) ≤ Fr(t) ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀od ∈W (13)
Xa(t) ≤ μa ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (14)
Xa(t) =
∑
od∈W
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t + Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (15)
fi,r(t) ∈ {0, 1}, Fr(t),Xa(t) ∈ Z+ ∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W. (16)
Each non-individual path variable Fr(t) in Eq.(13) is interpreted as a path capacity that is the number of
bundles of permits sold for the path. Constraint (12) is the condition that each user makes at most one trip.
Constraint (13) is the path capacity constraint on each path. Constraints (14) and (15) are the conditions that
the path capacity satisﬁes constraints stemming from link capacities.
This problem includes two types of variables, individual variables f and non-individual variables (F,X),
and is naturally becomes a bi-level problem based on Benders decomposition principle:
max
(F,X)
.
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) fi,r(F(t)) (17)
subject to Eq. (14), Eq. (15), and Fr(t),Xa(t) ∈ Z+,
where f(F) is an optimal solution of the following problem for a parameter F:
max
f≥0
.
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) fi,r(t) (18)
subject to Eq. (12) and Eq. (13),
The upper level problem (master problem) determines the optimal path capacity that maximizes the social
surplus. The lower level problem (sub-problem) determines the efﬁcient allocation of bundles of permits
under the condition that each path capacity is ﬁxed. Note that the sub-problem reduces to independent
sub-problems in terms of OD pairs because path capacities differ among OD pairs. Furthermore, the sub-
problem (18) is the Hitchcock transportation problem and so a linear relaxation of the sub-problem satisﬁes
total unimodularity (e.g., Papadimitriou and Steiglitz (1982)). Thus, we can obtain an integer solution by
solving a linear relaxation of the sub-problem because the path capacities are integer valued.
To demonstrate a clear relationship between the master problem and the sub-problem, we consider the
following dual problem of the sub-problem:
Z(F) ≡ min
(π,P)≥0
.
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πi +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t)Pr(t) (19)
subject to
πi ≥ vi,r(t) − Pr(t) ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W (20)
where (π,P) are Lagrange multipliers for constraints (12) and (13). As shown in 6.1, these Lagrange multi-
pliers equal to the user payoffs and competitive equilibrium bundle prices that are realized in an auction as
shown in Subsection (we call these variables demand information). From the duality theorem, the optimal
value of the objective function (19) coincides with the optimal value of the objective function (18); that is,
Z(F) =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πi(F) +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t)Pr(F(t)) =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) fi,r(F(t)), (21)
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Fig. 1. Procedure of the proposed mechanism
where (π(F),P(F)) is an optimal solution of the dual problem (19) for a parameter F. Hence, (π(F),P(F))
is an extreme point of the convex feasible region ΩSD that consists of the constraints (20) and non-negative
constraints. By using the function (21), we can transform the master problem into the following problem:
max
(F,X)
. Z(F) =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πi(F) +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t)Pr(F(t)) (22)
= max
(F,X)
.
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ min(πs,Ps)∈V .
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πsi +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t)Psr(t)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (23)
subject to Eq. (14), Eq. (15), and Fr(t),Xa(t) ∈ Z+,
where V is the ﬁnite set of all extreme points of the convex feasible region ΩSD. From this formulation,
we see that path capacities are adjusted on the basis of the demand information. Moreover, this problem is
equivalent to the following problem:
max
θ≥0, (F,X)
. θ (24)
subject to Eq. (14), Eq. (15), Fr(t),Xa(t) ∈ Z+,
θ ≤
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πsi +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t)Psr(t) ∀(πs,Ps) ∈ V (25)
Problem (24) is equivalent to the problem [DSO] (with non-individual variables) if all extreme points
are known. However, it is difﬁcult to obtain the extreme points in advance because the number of extreme
points is generally too large. Hence, we consider a relaxation problem (24) that has a subset of the extreme
points in V and produces an upper bound on the optimal objective value of the problem [DSO]. This relaxed
problem is called the restricted master problem [RMP]. We then employ an iterative approach by adding an
extreme point to the problem [RMP] to improve the upper bound. Note that an extreme point is generated
by solving the problem (19) for ﬁxed path capacities F.
The procedure of the proposed mechanism corresponds to solving the above two problems, iteratively.
One of the greatest differences between the Benders decomposition and the proposed mechanism is whether
or not coefﬁcient parameters vi (i.e., truthful valuations of each user) are initially given. As mentioned in
Section 4, the manager cannot observe such private information. Nevertheless, the proposed mechanism can
obtain the demand information by exploiting an auction mechanism for solving the sub-problem.
5.2. Interpretation as an auction mechanism with day-to-day capacity control
The day-to-day auction mechanism comprises an auction phase and a path capacity adjustment phase;
the two phases are repeated on a day-to-day basis (Fig.1). In the auction phase corresponding to the sub-
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problem, the manager sells bundles of permits to the users through an ascending auction under the condition
that each capacity is ﬁxed. In addition, the bundle prices are determined during the ascending auction so
as to maximize each user’s payoff. In the path capacity adjustment phase corresponding to the restricted
master problem, the manager adjust each path capacity to an appropriate level by considering the demand
information that was determined in the previous auction phases. Hence, the procedure of the day-to-day
auction mechanism can be summarized as follows (more details of the mechanism and its properties can be
found in Section 6):
1. Initial setting. Set s = 1. Determine the initial path capacities F1. Start with a set of extreme points
V1 = {∅} and a convergence criterion θ1 = ∞.
2. Auction phase (Subsection 6.1). For ﬁxed path capacities Fs, the manager sells bundles of permits
through an ascending auction. The user payoffs and the bundle prices (πs,Ps) are also determined. If
the social surplus SSs achieved in the ascending auction is equal to or greater than the convergence
criterion θs that is deﬁned in Subsection 6.2, then stop. Otherwise go to Step 3.
3. Path capacity adjustment phase (Subsection 6.2). Add an extreme point to the set; i.e., Vs+1 ≡ {Vs ∪
(πs,Ps)}. Produce the path capacities Fs+1 by solving the problem [RMP] and update the convergence
criterion θs+1. Let s = s + 1. Go to Step 2.
Note that stop in Step 2 means that optimal path capacities are obtained. Therefore, once the above
procedure stops, the manager no longer adjusts the path capacities and sells bundles through the auction
with the same optimal path capacities each day.
6. Details and properties of proposed mechanism and its properties
This section presents the details and properties of each phase of the day-to-day auction mechanism.
Subsection 6.1 gives a detailed explanation of the auction phase. Subsection 6.2 gives the detailed path
capacity adjustment rule. Subsection 6.3 analyzes the proposed overall mechanism combining two phases
and proves that the day-to-day dynamics of the network allocation pattern converges to the dynamic system
optimal allocation when the number of users is large.
6.1. Auction phase
In the auction phase, the manager sells bundles of permits to the users through an ascending auction for
ﬁxed path capacities. The procedure of this ascending auction corresponds to solving the sub-problem using
a primal-dual algorithm. Thus, we ﬁrst analyze solutions of both the sub-problem and its dual.
6.1.1. Competitive equilibrium in tradable network permit markets
Let Fs be the path capacities as determined in the path capacity adjustment phase on day s − 1. Then,
the sub-problem for each OD pair is given by the following linear program:
SSsod ≡ maxfs≥0 .
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) f si,r(t) (26)
subject to Eq. (12) and Eq. (13)
The necessary and sufﬁcient optimality conditions of the problem are given by the following Kuhn-Tucker
conditions:
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
πsi = vi,r(t) − Psr(t) if f si,r(t) = 1
πsi ≥ vi,r(t) − Psr(t) if f si,r(t) = 0
∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T,∀i ∈ Nod (27)
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
∑
i∈Nod f
s
i,r(t) = F
s
r(t) if Psr(t) > 0∑
i∈Nod f
s
i,r(t) ≤ Fsr(t) if Psr(t) = 0
∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T (28)
πsi ,P
s
r(t) ≥ 0 ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W. (29)
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Note that the allocation variables fs are integer because each sub-problem (26) satisﬁes total unimodularlity.
The solution (fs,πs,Ps) consists of a competitive equilibrium allocation, the payoffs and the prices, respec-
tively. In the competitive equilibrium, each user acquires the bundle of permits that maximizes his or her
utility (i.e., (27)) for the given set of competitive equilibrium prices that satisfy the market clearing condition
(28). Further, all users who acquire bundles have nonnegative payoffs (i.e., the user’s willingness-to-pay is
greater than the price), which is consistent with conventional trafﬁc assignments with elastic demand.
The concept of the competitive equilibrium for indivisible items is a natural extension of the classical
economic concept but for divisible items. Here the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of
this competitive equilibrium is that the optimal solution to the linear relaxation problem of the sub-problem
is integer (Bikhchandani and Mamer, 1997). In addition, it has been shown that the competitive equilibrium,
if it exists, is efﬁcient (Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002). This can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 6.1. In the tradable network permit markets on day s, there always exists a competitive equilibrium
that provides an efﬁcient network permit allocation pattern for a ﬁxed path capacity.
Proof . See Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) and Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002).
Note that the set of competitive equilibrium prices discussed above is not necessarily strategy-proof.
However, Leonard (1983) showed that minimal competitive equilibrium prices such that the payment for
each user is equal to the decrease in the value of the social surplus by adding the user to the auction are
equivalent to Vickrey payments that produce the strategy-proofness. In addition, Leonard (1983) formulated
the problem of ﬁnding the minimal competitive equilibrium prices:
min
(πs,Ps)≥0
.
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fsr(t)P
s
r(t) (30)
subject to Eq. (20),∑
i∈Nod
πsi +
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fsr(t)P
s
r(t) = SS
s
od. (31)
The problem minimizes equilibrium competitive prices (or maximizes user payoffs) subject to the condition
that the solution of this problem also solves the dual of the sub-problem.
From the above discussions, we ﬁnd that the sub-problem can be solved through the VCG mechanism
in a computationally efﬁcient manner: the allocation problem (26) is merely the transportation problem
and Vickrey payments are computed by solving only one linear program (30). However, there remains the
problem of complication of the bidding rule: each user has to submit sealed bids reporting the value of all
bundles of permits. This bidding rule is also undesirable in terms of the privacy, as users are required to
reveal more of their private information than is necessary.
6.1.2. Ascending proxy auction
The proposed mechanism employs an ascending auction to resolve the problems of sealed bid auctions
and to produce outcomes (i.e., allocation and prices of bundles of permits) in an informationally efﬁcient
manner. More speciﬁcally, we employ the (exact) ascending auction proposed by Demange et al. (1986)
(we call this the DGS auction). In this auction, users report only the “names” of bundles of permits in
which they are interested. The procedure of the DGS auction corresponds to solving the sub-problem using
a primal-dual algorithm, which is described as follows (see also Bikhchandani et al., 2002):
1. Initialization. Set Ps = 0 for all bundles.
2. Bidding phase. Each user reports “names” of the bundles that maximize one’s own payoff under the
current prices Ps, i.e., a demand set Di(Ps) ≡ arg maxr,t[vi,r(t)−Psr(t)]. If each user can be allocated a
bundle from his or her demand set, then stop because Ps are equilibrium prices. Otherwise go to Step
3.
3. Price adjustment phase. The manager chooses a minimal overdemanded set M(Ps) and raises the
prices of the bundles in that set (i.e., Psr(t) = Psr(t) + 1, ∀(r, t) ∈M(Ps)). Go to Step 2.
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Here, an overdemanded set is a set of bundles for which the number of users demanding only bundles
in that set exceeds the number of bundles sold in the auction, and the minimal overdemanded set is an
overdemanded set of bundles with no proper overdemanded subset.
In the DGS auction, the prices of the bundles converge to the minimal competitive equilibrium prices
if each user reports the demand set truthfully (i.e., a myopic best response strategy) because the minimal
overdemanded set is chosen in Step 3. Hence, the outcome of the DGS auction is equal to the VCG outcome.
Further, the truthful reporting of the demand set constitutes a Nash equilibrium for each user in each Step 2.
In a practical implementation of the DGS algorithm, it is hard for each user to report the demand set in
each bidding phase, i.e., the transaction cost is too large. We therefore introduce a proxy agent system to
support the bidding of users. Proxy systems are popular and have been installed in many Internet auctions
(e.g., eBay and Yahoo). Under such a system, each user reports valuations to a proxy agent for some bundles
that interest the user. Then, the proxy agent bids in the auction on the basis of the information received from
the user. This system not only reduces the transaction cost of the bidding phase but also prevents strategic
behaviors (e.g., a non-myopic best response strategy) in each bidding phase.
Let us now introduce the proxy agent system proposed by Parkes and Ungar (2000) into the DGS auction.
Step 1 and Step 2 are then modiﬁed as follows:
1
′
. Before starting the auction, each user reports information of valuations for some bundles to one’s own
proxy agent. Set Ps = 0 for all bundles.
2
′
. Based on the information received and the current prices, each proxy agent submits each user demand
set Di(Ps). If each user can be allocated a bundle from one’s own demand set, then stop because the
Ps are equilibrium prices. Otherwise go to Step 3.
In Step 2
′
, the user needs to update information if the proxy agent does not have enough information to
submit the demand set. Since the proxy DGS auction restricts user strategies (in each bidding phase) to
a myopic best response strategy, the dominant strategy is truthful reporting of the valuations to the proxy
agent. From what has been discussed above and Lemma 6.1, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 6.1. The network permit allocation pattern achieved under the proxy DGS auction for imple-
menting the tradable network permit markets on day s is efﬁcient, and the prices of bundles of permits
converge to the minimal competitive equilibrium prices. The dominant strategy for each user is truth report-
ing of the valuations of bundles to the proxy agent.
Proof . See Demange et al. (1986) and Parkes and Ungar (2000).
6.2. Path capacity adjustment phase
In the path capacity adjustment phase, the road manager ﬁrst generates the demand information (i.e.,
payoffs and prices). The prices Ps can be obtained directly in the auction phase for all OD pairs. The
payoffs πs, however, are computed indirectly. In the proxy DGS auction, since each user reports his or
her true valuations for interesting bundles to the proxy agent, the manager can obtain his or her winning
valuation v∗i,r(t). Then, the manager calculates a total payoff Π
s from the duality theorem:
Πs ≡
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πsi =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
v∗i,r(t) −
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fsr(t)P
s
r(t). (32)
Note that the manager needs to know only the total payoff to adjust path capacities.
After generating the demand information, the manager considers all demand information for the current
day and past days, Vs+1 ≡ {Vs ∪ (Πs,Ps)}, and adjusts each path capacity by solving the restricted master
problem [RMP]. However, this is computationally intensive because the problem [RMP] (i.e., the problem
(24)) is a large integer programming (IP) problem with one continuous variable. To avoid this, we solve
the linear relaxation of the problem [RMP] and obtain an integer solution by rounding off the fractional
solution. Such a strategy was suggested by McDaniel and Devine (1977) and has successfully used in various
problems (e.g., Cordeau et al., 2000). This strategy is suitable for our situation because non-individual
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variables (path capacities) in the problem [RMP] are control variables of the road manager and can be
treated as continuous variables, although the individual variables (allocation of network permits) cannot be
treated as continuous. In addition, we should note here that the relaxation of integrality constraints does not
affect the convex feasible region ΩSD of the dual sub-problem and that an extreme point can be generated
from any integer solution. Thus, the problem with continuous variables (F˜, X˜) that the road manager needs
to solve is given as
max
θ≥0, (F˜s+1,X˜s+1)≥0
. θ (33)
subject to
θ ≤ Πs +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
F˜s+1r (t)P
s
r(t) (Π
s,Ps) ∈ Vs+1 (34)
X˜s+1a (t) ≤ μa ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (35)
X˜s+1a (t) =
∑
od∈W
∑
r∈Rod
F˜s+1r (t + Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T. (36)
The optimal objective value is an upper bound on the maximum social surplus SS∗ of the problem [DSO],
which is weaker than an upper bound that is produced with the integer programming problem [RMP].
From the optimality conditions of the problem, a path capacity adjustment rule can be derived as
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
∑
a∈A pa(t − Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) = Pr(t) if F˜s+1r (t) > 0∑
a∈A pa(t − Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) ≥ Pr(t) if F˜s+1r (t) = 0
∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀od ∈W, (37)
where the P are the (convex combinations of) bundle prices that produce the weak upper bound (i.e., the
constraint (34) is bounded), and p is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (35). This Lagrange multiplier
is interpreted as a permit price for each link that satisﬁes the following (market clearing) condition:
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
X˜s+1a (t) = μa if pa(t) > 0
X˜s+1a (t) ≤ μa if pa(t) = 0
∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T. (38)
If the path capacity is positive in the path capacity adjustment rule (37), the bundle price estimated for the
path by means of link permit prices and is equal to the bundle price determined in the auction phase. For a
path whose the estimated price exceeds the realized price, the path capacity is zero. This means that no path
capacities are allocated to the worthless paths. The integer path capacities Fs+1 on day s+ 1 can be obtained
by rounding-off all continuous path capacities; i.e., Fs+1r (t) = F˜s+1r (t).
6.2.1. Stabilizing strategy for Benders decomposition
Although the problem (33) is easy to solve, there remains one issue relevant to the convergence rate of the
Benders decomposition; i.e., path capacities usually oscillate, which results in slow convergence (Magnanti
and Wong, 1981). To accelerate and stabilize the Benders decomposition, we add “boxstep constraints”
(Marsten et al., 1975) to the above problem (33):
F˜sr(t) −  ≤ F˜s+1r (t) ≤ F˜sr(t) +  ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀od ∈W, (39)
where  is a boxstep parameter. At each step, the solution F˜s+1 to the master problem is constrained to lie
within a box centered on the previous solution F˜s and so the oscillation is dramatically reduced. Note that
the problem including the boxstep constraints does not necessarily produce an upper bound on the maximum
social surplus SS∗. Thus, we solve the problem (33) to obtain the upper bound θ.
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Fig. 2. Relationship between the convergence criterion, the weak upper bound, the achieved social surplus, and the maximum social
surplus
6.3. Convergence of the day-to-day auction mechanism
We now establish the convergence result of the day-to-day auction mechanism on the basis of the Ben-
ders decomposition technique. The standard Benders decomposition algorithm converges to an optimal
solution when the strong upper bound obtained by the problem [RMP] is equal to the optimal objective
value of the sub-problem (i.e., the social surplus achieved in the auction phase). However, the weak upper
bound θ obtained with the proposed mechanism will exceed the maximum value of the social surplus SS∗
even if all the extreme points are generated, and thus we cannot use θ as the convergence criterion.
To resolve this problem, we introduce a new convergence criterion θ:
θ ≡ min
(Πs,Ps)∈Vs+1
. Πs +
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
Fs+1r (t)P
s
r(t), (40)
and an update rule of the criterion is
θs+1 = min
{
θs, θ
}
. (41)
The criterion θ optimizes (i.e., minimizes) the objective function of the problem [RMP] only with respect
to extreme points (Πs,Ps) given at the integer path capacities Fs+1, which results in good convergence
properties as shown in the proof of the proposition below. This criterion θ is equal to or less than the strong
upper bound since it does not maximize the objective function of the problem [RMP] with respect to the
path capacities. Therefore, we conclude that the permit allocation under the proposed mechanism converges
to an approximate dynamic system optimal state when the achieved social surplus SSs+1 (=
∑
od SSs+1od ) in
the auction phase is equal or more than the convergence criterion θs+1.
Fig.2 shows the relationship between the convergence criterion θs, the weak upper bound θ
s
, the
achieved social surplus SSs, and the maximum social surplus SS∗. The horizontal axis represents the social
surplus (or its upper bound) and dotted lines represent the ranges in which the variables can exist. The
achieved social surplus SSs can exist in the range [0,SS∗]. The convergence criterion and the weak upper
bound take minimum values θ∗ and θ
∗
when we have all the extreme points.
By using the convergence criterion θs, we obtain the value of the social surplus in a range that is repre-
sented by the solid arrow in Fig.2. The ratio SSs/SS∗ between the achieved social surplus and the maximum
value of the social surplus is conﬁned within in the range
θ∗
SS∗
≤ SS
s
SS∗
≤ 1. (42)
Assuming that the ratio between the total number of users Q (=
∑
od |Nod|) and the total link capacity∑
t
∑
a μa is held constant, the range (42) converges to zero (i.e., the left-hand side of Eq.(42) converges to
1) when the number of users is sufﬁciently large. This is because the effect of rounding off the continuous
path capacities is negligible in that case. In addition, a new extreme point is generated in each auction phase
when the achieved social surplus does not satisfy the convergence criterion, so the proposed mechanism can
converge in a ﬁnite number of steps. Therefore, the following proposition holds.
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Proposition 6.2. Assume that the ratio between the number of users and total link capacity is constant.
Then, the day-to-day auction mechanism converges in a ﬁnite number of steps, and the value of the social
surplus achieved by the mechanism reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large.
Proof . See Appendix A for the proof.
7. An extended mechanism which obviates path enumeration
The day-to-day auction mechanism presented in the previous sections assumes that the road manager
can enumerate all the paths that users may choose. However, it is not necessarily evident how the manager
should do so for large-scale networks. To obviate path enumeration, we construct an extended mechanism
by introducing a path generation phase into the day-to-day auction mechanism. This consists of applying a
column generation procedure to the system optimal allocation problem [DSO]. In the extended mechanism,
users generate paths successively, and hence path enumeration is obviated for the manager.
A column generation for a network ﬂow problem considers a problem that has only a subset of the
paths of the original problem (i.e., a restricted master problem) and paths are generated as needed (Ahuja,
Magnanti, and Orlin, 1993). Hence, by considering only a subset of the (dynamic) paths of the problem
[DSO], a restricted master problem [C-RMP] is formulated as
max
(f,x)
.
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod(t)
vi,r(t) fi,r(t) (43)
subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod(t)
fi,r(t) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W (44)
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
xi,a(t) ≤ μa ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (45)
xi,a(t) =
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod(t)
fi,r(t + Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod ∀od ∈W (46)
fi,r(t), xi,a(t) ∈ {0, 1} ∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ Rod(t), ∀t ∈ T ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W, (47)
where Rod(t) is a subset of paths in destination arrival time period t. Since the problem [C-RMP] and
the problem [DSO] have the same optimization problem except for the number of paths, we can solve the
problem [C-RMP] through the day-to-day auction mechanism presented in the previous sections.
A new path is generated by solving a column generation sub-problem corresponding to the pricing
step of the simplex algorithm (for the liner relaxation of the problem [C-RMP]). In the standard column
generation for a multicommodity ﬂow problem, the sub-problem is given as a shortest path problem for each
commodity (Ahuja et al., 1993). Thus, by following the standard theory, our sub-problem is formulated as
the following all-or-nothing problem for each user:
π∗i ≡ maxfi≥0 .
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣vi,r(t) −
∑
a∈A
pˆa(t − Ta,r)δa,r(o,d)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ fi,r(t) (48)
subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
fi,r(t) ≤ 1, (49)
where pˆa(t) is an optimal Lagrange multiplier for the link capacity constraint (45) of the linear relaxation
of the restricted master problem [C-RMP], which is interpreted as an optimal link permit price. These link
permit prices are obtained at the ﬁnal path capacity adjustment phase of the day-to-day auction mechanism
(see Subsection 6.2).
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The column generation sub-problem yields a path that maximizes each user payoff for given constant
link permit prices pˆ. The path is generated if a maximum payoff exceeds the current payoff achieved in the
ﬁnal auction phase of the day-to-day auction mechanism. Speciﬁcally, the path is generated if the optimal
value of the objective function π∗i exceeds an optimal Lagrange multiplier πˆi for the constraint (44); i.e.,
λi ≡ π∗i − πˆi > 0. To improve his or her payoff, the user requests that the manager sells the bundle for
the path in the auction phase. The road manager receives the requests of all users and adds the paths to the
set Rod(t) (if the path do not exists in the set). Then the restricted master problem [C-RMP] is again solved
through the day-to-day auction mechanism.
The steps in the extended mechanism mentioned above can be summarized as follows:
1. Initial setting. Set n = 1. Determine the initial path set R1od(t) for each OD pair at each destination
arrival time period.
2. Day-to-day auction phase. For a ﬁxed path set Rnod(t), the restricted master problem [C-RMP] is
solved through the day-to-day auction mechanism (see Section 5 and 6). The optimal link permit
prices pˆn are determined in the ﬁnal path capacity adjustment phase and are announced by the road
manager.
3. Path generation phase. Each user ﬁnds a path by solving the column generation sub-problem and
requests that the manager adds the path if the maximum payoff π∗i exceeds the current payoff πˆ
n. If
all requested paths exist in the path set Rnod(t), then stop. Otherwise, the road manager creates a new
path set Rn+1od (t) by adding requested paths to the set R
n
od(t). Let n = n + 1. Go to Step 2.
The paths are efﬁciently generated in Step 3 because the numerous number users generate paths simulta-
neously. However, the road manager employs a path-adding rule that allows each user to purchase not only
paths generated by himself but also those generated by other users of the same OD pair8, which promotes
path generation. The extended mechanism is guaranteed to converge because the number of paths is ﬁnite.
Furthermore, when the number of users is large, the allocation of network permits achieved under the ex-
tended mechanism converges to the optimal one (i.e., the optimal solution of the problem [DSO]) since the
gap between the problem [DSO] and the linear relaxation converges to zero (Proposition 6.2).
8. Numerical example
We ﬁnally show a numerical example to demonstrate the convergence properties of the proposed mech-
anism in a realistic network. The network that we employ is the Sioux Falls network (LeBlanc et al., 1975)
which has 24 nodes and 76 links (Fig.3). The physical conditions of each link (i.e., free-ﬂow travel time,
capacity), which is based on Han (2003), are summarized in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The network has 528
OD pairs, which was used by (LeBlanc et al., 1975), and the number of users for each OD pair is a quarter
of the number provided in Dr. Hillel Bar-Gera’s website (http://www.bgu.ac.il/˜bargera/tntp/); i.e., the total
number of users is 90150. We set time interval for each time period to Δt = 3 (minute) and the number of
time periods to |T| = 40. The desired arrival time period for each user is set randomly and the distribution
of the desired arrival time periods is shown in Fig.4. Under this distribution, the network is congested (i.e.,
almost links have positive permit prices) during peak periods. As the initial path set for each OD pair, we
simply choose some shortest paths. A box step parameter  = 5 is chosen. An optimal social surplus is
calculated by 10,000 iterations of the proposed mechanism for a sufﬁciently accurate determination of the
maximum one.
Fig.5 illustrates the convergence process of the proposed mechanism until the relative error between
the achieved social surplus SSs and the optimal social surplus is reduced below 0.05%. The horizontal axis
represents the number of days, s, and the vertical axis represents the ratio between the achieved social surplus
SSs on each day and the optimal social surplus. The vertical lines (at day 59, 110, 164, 232, . . . ) show days
8If we employ the standard column generation procedure, subsets of the paths differ among users because the column generation
sub-problem (48) is formulated for each user. However, in the auction phase, it will be more natural that the same set of paths are sold
for all users of the same OD pair.
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Fig. 3. Sioux Falls network Fig. 4. Distribution of the desired arrival time
Fig. 5. Convergence process of the proposed mechanism Fig. 6. Number of paths in each day-to-day auction phase
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at which a day-to-day auction phase (or mechanism) terminated. On such a day, the path generation phase
starts. Note that the path set is ﬁxed in each day-to-day auction phase.
By using Fig.5, we explain the convergence properties of the ﬁrst day-to-day auction phase from day 1
to day 59. In this phase, the achieved social surplus SSs (the solid black curve) increases as path capacities
are adjusted on a day-to-day basis. Conversely, the upper bound of the maximum social surplus θ
s
(the
gray curve) for a ﬁxed path set and the convergence criterion θs (the black dotted curve) that are obtained
in the path capacity adjustment phase decrease monotonically. Eventually, these three values converge to
the almost the same value. This means that the allocation of network permits achieved under the day-to-day
auction phase converges to the approximate dynamic system optimal allocation for a ﬁxed path set.
After the ﬁrst day-to-day auction phase terminates (at day 59), the ﬁrst path generation phase starts. In
the path generation phase, each user requests a path to improve his or her payoff based on the current permit
prices and payoff realized in the previous day-to-day auction phase. The achieved social surplus increases
drastically in the second day-to-day auction phase. This is because a large number of paths is generated in
the ﬁrst path generation phase (see Fig.6). We also see from Fig.6 that the number of paths generated in
each subsequent phase decreases, and then the achieved social surplus reaches close to the optimal value
with a small number of iterations of the path generation phase.
9. Conclusion
Akamatsu et al. (2006) and Akamatsu (2007b) proposed a dynamic trafﬁc congestion control scheme—
the tradable network permits—and proved its efﬁciency properties for general networks. To implement
trading markets for the network permits, we proposed an auction mechanism for general networks. We ﬁrst
discussed the impossibility of applying the VCG mechanism to the trading markets due to NP-hardness.
To avoid such computational infeasibility, we constructed a day-to-day auction mechanism that is readily
implementable. We then proved that the proposed mechanism is strategy-proof and that the network permit
allocation pattern under this mechanism converges to an approximation of the socially optimal state in
the sense that the achieved social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large.
Furthermore, we showed that the proposed mechanism can be extended to obviate path enumeration by
introducing a column generation procedure, and we demonstrated its convergence properties for a realistic
network.
Throughout this paper, we constructed the implementation mechanism for tradable network permits,
considering the ﬁrst-best situation in which the road manager can issue network permits for all links. This
does not necessarily implies that the proposed mechanism works effectively in the second-best situation in
which the manager can issue permits for partial links. In that case, queuing congestion occurs at a link that is
not controlled by the scheme. To address the case, we need to connect the tradable network permits scheme
to a DTA problem; this is not a trivial problem because we would face complex interactions among queuing
congestion. Nevertheless, since this direction of research increases the applicability of the scheme and its
implementation mechanism, further exploration on this issue is one of the challenging but important issues
that should be addressed in future work.
While this paper has focused on managing road transportation networks, the mechanism proposed seems
applicable in principle to the management of other transportation networks (e.g., railway and freight net-
works). For example, freight networks have many users who choose routes and departure times so as to
maximize their utility as is the case for road transportation networks. In contrast, the behaviors of network
managers are totally different; i.e., while a road manager aims to maximize the social surplus, a freight
network manager (i.e., a freight company) aims to maximize its proﬁt. Nevertheless, managing other trans-
portation networks using the proposed mechanism seems a fruitful topic for future work.
Acknowledgements
The research was partially supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Grant-in-Aid
for JSPS Fellows 11J07829. The authors would like to thank four anonymous referees for their valuable
comments and suggestions.
323 Kentaro Wada and Takashi Akamatsu /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  80 ( 2013 )  304 – 326 
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 6.2
We ﬁrst show that a new extreme point is generated in every auction phase until the convergence criterion
is satisﬁed. We denote the path capacities at day s by Fs and the convergence criterion by θs. From the
Eq.(40), the following holds:
θs ≤ Πs +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
Fsr(t)P
s
r(t) ∀(Πs,Ps) ∈ Vs (A.1)
holds. From the duality theorem, the optimal value of the objective function of the sub-problem at day s (i.e.,
the value of the social surplus achieved by the ascending proxy auction), SSsod, coincides with the optimal
value of the objective function of its dual problem, that is
SSs =
∑
od∈W
SSsod =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) f s∗i,r(t) = Π
s∗ +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fsr(t)P
s∗
r (t), (A.2)
where (fs∗,Πs∗,Ps∗) is the optimal solution of the sub-problem and its dual problem. We here consider the
case that the convergence criterion is not satisﬁed (i.e., SSs < θs). Then, the following relationships are
hold: ∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πs∗i +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fsr(t)P
s∗
r (t) = SS
s
< θs ≤ Πs +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
Fsr(t)P
s
r(t) (∀(Πs,Ps) ∈ Vs). (A.3)
Hence, (Πs∗,Ps∗)  (Πs,Ps) ∈ Vs is obtained; i.e., a new extreme point is generated. Since the number of
extreme points is ﬁnite, we can conclude that the proposed mechanism converges in a ﬁnite number of steps.
Next, we show that the ratio θ∗/SS∗ in the left-hand side of Eq.(42) converges to 1 when the number
of users is large (assuming that the ratio between the number of uses and the total link capacity is held
constant). In order to show this, we prove that a ratio θ∗/θ
∗
that is less than θ∗/SS∗ converges to 1. We
denote the extreme point that minimizes the problem (40) by (Π,P) ∈ V, and we denote the extreme point
that produces the weak upper bound θ
∗
by (Π,P) ∈ V. Then the gap between θ∗ and θ∗ is investigated with
the following equations:
θ
∗ − θ∗ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Π+
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
F˜s+1r (t)Pr(t)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ −
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Π+
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
Fr(t)Pr(t)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (A.4)
≤
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Π +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
F˜s+1r (t)Pr(t)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ −
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Π+
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
Fr(t)Pr(t)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (A.5)
<
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
Pr(t)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ = (the number of paths) × (average price). (A.6)
The second line represents the fact that the extreme points of minimizing (40) and (33) are different. The
third line follows because the maximum rounded value of each path capacity is 1.
Alternatively, θ
∗
can be estimated as follows:
θ
∗ ≥ SS∗ =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
v∗i,r(t) = (the number of users) × (average winning valuation) (A.7)
where v∗i,r(t) is the winning valuation when the social surplus is maximized. By using the above equations,
the relative error between θ
∗
and θ∗ is obtained as follows:
θ
∗ − θ∗
θ
∗ <
(the number of paths) × (average price)
(the number of users) × (average winning valuation) <
(the number of paths)
(the number of users)
. (A.8)
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Since the bundle prices obtained by the ascending proxy auction never exceed the truthful valuation of each
user, the ﬁnal inequality holds. When the number of users is large (i.e., Q→∞) with the ratio between the
number of users and the total link capacity held constant, the relative error converges to zero because the
number of paths is constant. Thus, the following equations hold:
lim
Q→∞
θ∗
θ
∗ = 1 ⇒ limQ→∞
θ∗
SS∗
= 1 (A.9)
Hence, we can conclude that the range (42) converges to zero when the number of users is large.
Appendix B. Network data
Table B.1. Physical conditions of links in Sioux Falls network
Link Free-ﬂow Capacity Link Free-ﬂow Capacity
(upstream, travel time [vehicles (upstream, travel time [vehicles
downstream) [min] /min] downstream) [min] /min]
(1, 2) and (2, 1) 9 65 (11, 12) and (12, 11) 3 60
(1, 3) and (3, 1) 3 55 (11, 14) and (14, 11) 6 50
(2, 6) and (6, 2) 3 60 (12, 13) and (13, 12) 9 65
(3, 4) and (4, 3) 3 60 (13, 24) and (24, 13) 3 60
(3, 12) and (12, 3) 6 60 (14, 15) and (15, 14) 3 50
(4, 5) and (5, 4) 3 50 (14, 23) and (23, 14) 3 40
(4, 11) and (11, 4) 6 55 (15, 19) and (19, 15) 3 40
(5, 6) and (6, 5) 3 50 (15, 22) and (22, 15) 3 45
(5, 9) and (9, 5) 3 50 (16, 17) and (17, 16) 3 45
(6, 8) and (8, 6) 3 45 (16, 18) and (18, 16) 3 55
(7, 8) and (8, 7) 3 40 (17, 19) and (19, 17) 3 45
(7, 18) and (18, 7) 3 50 (18, 20) and (20, 18) 12 55
(8, 9) and (9, 8) 3 45 (19, 20) and (20, 19) 6 50
(8, 16) and (16, 8) 3 45 (20, 21) and (21, 20) 3 40
(9, 10) and (10, 9) 3 45 (20, 22) and (22, 20) 6 45
(10, 11) and (11, 10) 3 50 (21, 22) and (22, 21) 3 50
(10, 15) and (15, 10) 6 45 (21, 24) and (24, 21) 3 50
(10, 16) and (16, 10) 3 40 (22, 23) and (23, 22) 3 40
(10, 17) and (17, 10) 3 45 (23, 24) and (24, 23) 3 40
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